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Abstract
A repairable threshold scheme (which we abbreviate to RTS ) is a (τ, n)-threshold scheme
in which a subset of players can “repair” another player’s share in the event that their share
has been lost or corrupted. This will take place without the participation of the dealer who set
up the scheme. The repairing protocol should not compromise the (unconditional) security of
the threshold scheme. Combinatorial repairable threshold schemes (or combinatorial RTS ) were
recently introduced by Stinson and Wei [8]. In these schemes, “multiple shares” are distributed
to each player, as defined by a suitable combinatorial design called the distribution design. In
this paper, we study the reliability of these combinatorial repairable threshold schemes in a
setting where players may not be available to take part in a repair of a given player’s share.
Using techniques from network reliability theory, we consider the probability of existence of an
available repair set, as well as the expected number of available repair sets, for various types of
distribution designs.
1 Introduction to Combinatorial Repairability
Suppose that τ and n are positive integers such that τ ≤ n. Informally, a (τ, n)-threshold scheme
is a method whereby a dealer chooses a secret and distributes a share to each of n players (denoted
by P1, . . . , Pn) such that the following two properties are satisfied:
reconstruction Any subset of τ players can compute the secret from the shares that they collec-
tively hold, and
secrecy No subset of τ − 1 players can determine any information about the secret.
∗D.R. Stinson’s Research is supported by NSERC discovery grant RGPIN-03882.
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We call τ the threshold of the scheme.
In this paper, we are only interested in schemes that are unconditionally secure. That is, all
security results are valid against adversaries with unlimited computational power.
The efficiency of secret sharing is often measured in terms of the information rate of the scheme,
which is defined to be the ratio ρ = log2 |K|/ log2 |S| (where S is the set of all possible shares and K
is the set of all possible secrets). That is, the information rate is the ratio of the size of the secret
to the size of a share. For a threshold scheme, a fundamental result states that ρ ≤ 1.
We briefly describe a standard construction for threshold schemes with optimal information
rate, namely, the classical Shamir threshold scheme [6]. The construction takes place over a finite
field FQ, where Q ≥ n+ 1.
1. In the Initialization Phase, the dealer, denoted by D, chooses n distinct, non-zero elements
of FQ, denoted xi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. The values xi are public. For 1 ≤ i ≤ n, D gives the value xi
to player Pi.
2. In the Share Distribution phase, D chooses a secret
K = a0 ∈ FQ.
Then D secretly chooses (independently and uniformly at random)
a1, . . . , aτ−1 ∈ FQ.
Finally, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, D computes the share yi = a(xi), where
a(x) =
τ−1∑
j=0
aj x
j,
and gives it to player Pi.
Reconstruction is easily accomplished using the Lagrange interpolation formula (see, e.g., [7,
§11.5.1]).
The problem of share repairability has been considered by several authors in recent years (see
Laing and Stinson [5] for a survey on this topic). The problem setting is that a certain player Pℓ (in
a (τ, n)-threshold scheme, say) loses their share. The goal is to find a “secure” protocol involving
Pℓ and a subset of the other players that allows the missing share yℓ to be reconstructed. (Of course
the dealer could simply re-send the share to Pℓ, but we are considering a setting where the dealer is
no longer present in the scheme after the initial setup.) In general, we will assume secure pairwise
channels linking pairs of players.
A combinatorial solution to this problem was proposed by Stinson and Wei [8]. These schemes
are termed combinatorial RTS. The construction is based on an old technique from [1, Theorem
1], namely, giving each player a subset of shares from an underlying threshold scheme called a base
scheme1
1Actually, there are situations where there are efficiency advantages to use a ramp scheme as the base scheme,
instead of a threshold scheme. This is addressed in some detail in [8]. However, for the purposes of repairability, it is
irrelevant if we use a ramp scheme, as opposed to a threshold scheme. So we do not discuss the use of ramp schemes
in this paper.
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Suppose the base scheme is an (σ,m)-threshold scheme, say a Shamir scheme, implemented over
a finite field FQ. We then give each player a certain subset of d of the m shares. A set system (or
design) consisting of n blocks of size d, defined on a set of m points, will be used to do this. This
design is termed the distribution design.
We will call the shares of the base (σ,m)-threshold scheme subshares. Each share in the resulting
(τ, n)-threshold scheme, which we call the expanded scheme, consists of d subshares. Suppose the
shares in the base scheme are denoted s1, . . . , sm, and suppose that the points in the distribution
design are denoted 1, . . . ,m. Each player Pi corresponds to a block Bi of the distribution design.
For each point x ∈ Bi, the player Pi is given the subshare sx. The points in a block are indices
of subshares received by a given player. The blocks are public information, while the values of the
shares and subshares are secret.
We need to ensure that the relevant threshold property is satisfied for the expanded threshold
scheme. We also need to be able to repair the share of any player in the expanded scheme by
appropriately choosing a certain set of other players, who will then send appropriate subshares to
the player whose share is being repaired.
Let the blocks in the distribution design be denoted B1, . . . , Bn and let X denote the set of m
points on which the design is defined. The desired threshold property for the expanded scheme will
be satisfied provided that the following two conditions hold in the distribution design:
the union of any τ blocks contains at least σ points (1)
and
the union of any τ − 1 blocks contains at most σ − 1 points. (2)
Summarizing, we have the following theorem from [8].
Theorem 1.1. Suppose (X,B) is a distribution design with |X| = m and |B| = n. Let τ and σ
be positive integers and suppose (1) and (2) are satisfied for the given distribution design. Then, if
we use a base (σ,m)-threshold scheme in conjunction with the given distribution design, we obtain
an expanded (τ, n)-threshold scheme.
1.1 Repairing a Share
Now, suppose we want to repair the share for a player Pℓ corresponding to the block Bℓ. For
each point x ∈ Bℓ, we find another block that contains x. The corresponding player can send the
subshare sx corresponding to x to Pℓ. We illustrate the technique with an example.
Example 1.2. Suppose we start with a (9, 3, 1)-BIBD (an affine plane of order 3), which has n = 12
blocks of size d = 3. There are m = 9 points in the design. We associate a block of the design with
each player:
P1 ↔ B1 = {1, 2, 3} P2 ↔ B2 = {4, 5, 6} P3 ↔ B3 = {7, 8, 9}
P4 ↔ B4 = {1, 4, 7} P5 ↔ B5 = {2, 5, 8} P6 ↔ B6 = {3, 6, 9}
P7 ↔ B7 = {1, 5, 9} P8 ↔ B8 = {2, 6, 7} P9 ↔ B9 = {3, 4, 8}
P10 ↔ B10 = {1, 6, 8} P11 ↔ B11 = {2, 4, 9} P12 ↔ B12 = {3, 5, 7}
Each player gets d = 3 shares from a (5, 9)-threshold scheme, as specified by the associated block.
This threshold scheme has nine shares, denoted s1, . . . , s9. Each block lists the indices of shares
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held by a given player; thus P1 has the shares s1, s2 and s3. Each block contains three points and
the union of any two blocks contains at least five points. Thus (1) and (2) are satisfied for τ = 2
and σ = 5 and therefore the expanded scheme is a (2, 12)-threshold scheme.
Now suppose P1 wishes to repair their share. P1 requires the subshares s1, s2 and s3. The
subshare s1 can be obtained from P4, P7 or P10; the subshare s2 can be obtained from P5, P8 or
P11; and the subshare s3 can be obtained from P6, P9 or P12. 
In general, it is not a requirement that the d subshares are obtained from d different blocks.
For example, it could happen that d = 3, one block contributes two subshares, and one block
contributes one subshare during the repairing process. See Section 3 for further discussion of this
idea.
It is quite simple to analyze the security of combinatorial repairability. The main point to
observe is that the information collectively held by any subset of players (after the repairing protocol
is completed) consists only of their shares in the expanded scheme. They did not obtain any
information collectively that they did not already possess before the execution of the repairing
protocol. So, it is immediate that a set τ − 1 players cannot compute the secret after the repairing
of a share occurs.
The paper [8] provides several constructions for combinatorial RTS. Different distribution de-
signs are studied and analyzed according to various metrics. Here, we are only interested in re-
pairability properties, so we do not address these other metrics.
1.2 Reliability
Given a player Pℓ in a combinatorial RTS, a subset of players that can repair Pℓ’s share is called a
repair set for Pℓ. A repair set P for a player Pℓ is minimal if no proper subset of P is a repair set
for Pℓ. In Example 1.2, there are 3
3 = 27 minimal repair sets for any given player.
We are interested in studying the situation where some of the players might not be available
when asked to provide a subshare to repair another player’s share. We will make the assumption
that any player is available with a fixed probability p (and therefore unavailable with probability
1− p). We also assume that the availability of any player is independent of the availability of any
other player. A repair set is available if every player in the set is available.
In the above setting, we can ask two basic questions for a given player associated with a given
distribution design:
1. What is the probability R(p) that there is at least one available repair set?
2. What is the expected number E(p) of available minimal repair sets?
We illustrate these concepts by considering the distribution design presented in Example 1.2.
Example 1.3. There is an available repair set for P1 if and only if
• at least one of P4, P7 or P10 is available,
• at least one of P5, P8 or P11 is available, and
• at least one of P6, P9 or P12 is available.
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Therefore, for P1,
R(p) = (1− (1− p)3)3.
In fact, R(p) takes on the same value for any player in this RTS.
To compute the expected number of minimal repair sets, we observe that there are 27 minimal
repair sets, each of which is available with probability p3. By linearity of expectation, E(p) = 27p3.
Again, this value is the same for any player in the scheme. 
1.3 Design Theory Definitions
We now review some standard definitions and basic results from design theory. Most of these results
can be found in standard references such as [3].
Definition 1.4. Suppose 2 ≤ k < v. A (v, k, λ)-balanced incomplete block design, or (v, k, λ)-BIBD,
is a design (X,B) such that:
1. |X| = v,
2. each block B ∈ B contains exactly k points, and
3. every pair of distinct points from X is contained in exactly λ blocks.
Theorem 1.5. Every point in a (v, k, λ)-BIBD occurs in exactly
r = λ(v−1)
k−1
blocks. The value r is termed the replication number.
Theorem 1.6. A (v, k, λ)-BIBD has exactly
b =
vr
k
=
λ(v2 − v)
k2 − k
blocks of size k.
Definition 1.7. A Steiner triple system, or STS(v), is a (v, 3, 1)-BIBD.
Theorem 1.8. There exists an STS(v) if and only if v ≡ 1, 3 (mod 6), v ≥ 7.
Definition 1.9. A t-(v, k, λ)-design is a design where:
1. |X| = v,
2. each block B ∈ B contains exactly k points, and
3. every set of t points from the set X occurs in exactly λ blocks.
Definition 1.10. A 3-(v, 4, 1)-design is a Steiner quadruple system of order v, denoted SQS(v).
Theorem 1.11. An SQS(v) exists if and only if v ≡ 2, 4 (mod 6).
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Theorem 1.12. [3, Theorem II.4.8] The ith replication number, denoted ri, of a t-(v, k, 1)-design
is defined to be the number of blocks containing any given set of i points. It is known that
ri =
λ
(
v−i
t−i
)
(
k−i
t−i
) ,
for 1 ≤ i ≤ t.
Theorem 1.13. The number of blocks in a t-(v, k, 1)-design is
b =
(
v
t
)
(
k
t
) = vr1
k
.
Definition 1.14. An inversive geometry is a 3-(nd + 1, n+ 1, 1)-design, where d ≥ 2.
Theorem 1.15. An inversive geometry exsits for any d ≥ 2 if n is a prime power.
1.4 Organization of the Paper
The remaining sections of the paper are organized as follows. In Section 2, we study the reliability
metrics for BIBDs. In Section 3, we turn to t-designs with t > 2, which have not previously been
studied as distribution designs. After addressing the possible thresholds that can be obtained, we
again consider the reliability metrics. Finally, Section 4 is a brief summary.
2 Using BIBDs as Distribution Designs
Stinson and Wei [8] examined several types of BIBDs with λ = 1 for use as distribution designs
in combinatorial RTS. They studied the thresholds of these RTS as well as their efficiency with
respect to storage, communication complexity and computational complexity. In this section, we
study the reliability of these RTS using the measures defined in Section 1.2.
Before proceeding further, we define some notation that will be used in the rest of the paper.
Definition 2.1. Suppose (X,B) is a distribution design for a combinatorial RTS. For any fixed
block Bi ∈ B, let Pi be the corresponding player in the RTS. Further, for any xj ∈ Bi, define
Cj = {B ∈ B \ {Bi} : xj ∈ B}.
Finally, let Pj = {Pi : Bi ∈ Cj}.
Example 2.2. We refer to Examples 1.2 and 1.3. For the block B1 = {1, 2, 3}, we have
C1 = {B4, B7, B10}
C2 = {B5, B8, B11}
C3 = {B6, B9, B12}
and therefore
P1 = {P4, P7, P10}
P2 = {P5, P8, P11}
P3 = {P6, P9, P12}.

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As in Section 1.2, we define R(p) to be the probability that there is at least one available repair
set for a given player.
Theorem 2.3. Suppose (X,B) is a (v, k, 1)-BIBD that is used as a distribution design for a com-
binatorial RTS, and let Pi be any player in the scheme. Then
R(p) = (1− (1− p)r−1)k.
Proof. Let the block corresponding to Pi be Bi = {x1, . . . , xk}. Consider the sets Cj , for 1 ≤ j ≤ k,
as defined in Definition 2.1. Clearly |Cj| = r − 1 for 1 ≤ j ≤ k and Cj ∩ Cj′ = ∅ if j 6= j
′.
The probability that at least one player in Pj is available is 1− (1− p)
r−1. Then, since the sets
Pj are disjoint, the probability that at least one player in each Pj is available is (1−(1−p)
r−1)k.
Now we consider the expected number of repair sets when using a (v, k, 1)-BIBD as a distribution
design.
Theorem 2.4. Suppose (X,B) is a (v, k, 1)-BIBD that is used as a distribution design for a com-
binatorial RTS, and let Pi be any player in the scheme. Then
E(p) = (r − 1)kpk.
Proof. Let Bi = {x1, . . . , xk}. The minimal repair sets are precisely the sets in P1 × · · · × Pk. The
number of minimal repair sets is therefore (r − 1)k. The probability that a given minimal repair
set is available is pk.
Let the minimal repair sets be enumerated as M1, . . . ,Ms, where s = (r − 1)
k. For 1 ≤ i ≤ s,
let the random variable Xi be defined as
Xi =
{
1, if Mi is available
0, otherwise.
Clearly E[Xi] = p
k for all i. Define
X = X1 +X2 + · · · +Xs;
then
E[X] = E[X1] + E[X2] + · · ·+ E[Xs]
by linearity of expectation. Therefore,
E(p) = E[X] = spk = (r − 1)kpk.
It would of course be possible to use a (v, k, λ)-BIBD as a distribution design even if λ > 1.
Unfortunately, there do not seem to be general formulas, analogous to Theorems 2.3 and 2.4, for
these designs.
7
3 Using t-Designs as Distribution Designs
It is also possible to use t-(v, k, 1)-designs with t > 2 as distribution designs. This idea has not
previously been discussed in the literature. One possible advantage over just using 2-designs is that
blocks can intersect in more than one point, so a repair may be possible by contacting a smaller
number of other players. Since blocks in a t-(v, k, 1)-design can intersect in up to t − 1 points, it
follows that a repair can be carried out by contacting ⌈ k
t−1⌉ other players, if they are available.
First, we determine the thresholds that can be achieved, in particular, by Steiner quadruple
systems and inversive geometries. Later in this section we analyze the reliability of the RTS derived
from them.
3.1 Distribution Designs and Thresholds
For a given distribution design, it is of interest to determine the thresholds that can be realized in
an expanded scheme. This involves choosing values for τ and σ in such a way that (1) and (2) are
satisfied, and then applying Theorem 1.1. We provide some results along this line in this section.
We note that similar techniques were used in [8] for 2-designs.
Theorem 3.1. An SQS(v) can be used as a distribution design to produce an RTS with threshold
2.
Proof. Let τ = 2 and σ = 6. It is clear that one block in an SQS(v) contains exactly four points.
Two blocks contain at least six points, because two blocks intersect in at most two points. Therefore,
(1) and (2) are satisfied when τ = 2 and σ = 6, and we obtain an expanded scheme with threshold
2.
Now, we show how to construct RTS with threshold 3 from certain t-designs.
Theorem 3.2. A t-(v, k, 1)-design can be used as a distribution design to produce an RTS with
threshold 3 if k ≥ 3t− 2.
Proof. Let τ = 2 and σ = 3k − 3(t − 1). Clearly the union of any two blocks contains at most 2k
points. Now consider three blocks. If any two of these blocks have t − 1 points in common, and
these three intersections are disjoint, then the three blocks contain 3k−3(t−1) points, which is the
minimum possible. In order for (1) and (2) to be satisfied, we require 3k− 3(t− 1) ≥ 2k+1, which
is equivalent to k ≥ 3t − 2. If this inequality is satisfied, then the expanded scheme has threshold
3.
More generally, we have the following result, which has a similar proof.
Theorem 3.3. A t-(v, k, 1)-design can be used as a distribution design to produce an RTS with
threshold τ if k ≥
(
τ
2
)
(t− 1) + 1.
Proof. Let σ = τk−
(
τ
2
)
(t− 1). Clearly τ − 1 blocks contain at most (τ − 1)k points. For a set of τ
blocks, the minimum size of their union results when any two of them contain t−1 common points,
and these intersections are all disjoint. So the union contains at least τk −
(
τ
2
)
(t − 1) points. In
order for (1) and (2) to be satisfied, we require τk −
(
τ
2
)
(t− 1) ≥ (τ − 1)k + 1, which is equivalent
to k ≥
(
τ
2
)
(t− 1) + 1. If this inequality is satisfied, then the expanded scheme has threshold τ .
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The inversive geometries allow us to construct RTS with any desired threshold. Taking t = 3
in Theorem 3.3, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 3.4. A 3-(v, k, 1)-design can be used as a distribution design to produce an RTS with
threshold τ if k ≥ τ(τ − 1) + 1.
Remark 3.5. In order to obtain τ = 3, we require k ≥ 7 in Corollary 3.4; to obtain τ = 4, we
require k ≥ 13, etc.
3.2 Reliability
In our analysis, to compute the reliability metrics for repair sets, we employ the use of cutsets
from network reliability theory (see Colbourn [2] for basic results and terminology relating to
network reliability). When using BIBDs as distribution designs, we were able to easily compute
reliability formulas in Section 2 without the use of this methodology because the sets Cj were
disjoint. However, it is advantageous to use cutsets to analyze the reliability of the RTS constructed
using distribution designs with t ≥ 3.
In this section, for brevity, we will conflate the notion of players and blocks and express all our
arguments in terms of blocks of the distribution design (X,B).
Definition 3.6. A cutset for a block B is a minimal subset of blocks B′ such that a repair is not
possible if all the blocks in B′ are not available. A cutset fails if every block in the cutset is not
available.
Lemma 3.7. Let B = {x1, . . . , xk} be a block in the distribution design. Then the sets Cj, for
1 ≤ j ≤ k, are the cutsets.
Example 3.8. Here are the blocks in an 3-(8, 4, 1)-design:
A1 = {1, 2, 3, 4} A2 = {5, 6, 7, 8}
B1 = {1, 2, 5, 6} B2 = {1, 2, 7, 8}
B3 = {1, 3, 5, 7} B4 = {1, 3, 6, 8}
B5 = {1, 4, 5, 8} B6 = {1, 4, 6, 7}
B7 = {3, 4, 7, 8} B8 = {3, 4, 5, 6}
B9 = {2, 4, 6, 8} B10 = {2, 4, 5, 7}
B11 = {2, 3, 6, 7} B12 = {2, 3, 5, 8}
Suppose A1 wants to repair their share. Then, the relevant cutsets are
C1 = {B1, B2, B3, B4, B5, B6}
C2 = {B1, B2, B9, B10, B11, B12}
C3 = {B3, B4, B7, B8, B11, B12}
C4 = {B5, B6, B7, B8, B9, B10}.

Lemma 3.9. Let B = {x1, . . . , xk} be a block in the distribution design (X,B). There exists an
available repair set for B if and only if no Cj, for 1 ≤ j ≤ k, fails.
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3.3 Existence of Available Repair Sets for t-(v, k, 1) Designs
First, we consider Steiner quadruple systems, as a warmup. Then we generalize our formulas to
arbitrary t-(v, k, 1) designs.
Theorem 3.10. Suppose (X,B) is an SQS(v) and let B = {x1, x2, x3, x4} ∈ B. Let q = 1 − p,
where p is the probability that a block is available. Then
R(p) = 1− 4qr1−1 + 6q2r1−r2−1 − 4q3r1−3r2 + q4r1−6r2+2,
where r1 =
(
v−1
2
)
/3 and r2 =
(
v−2
1
)
/2 are the replication numbers of the SQS.
Proof. From Lemma 3.9, a repair set exists if no Cj fails, 1 ≤ j ≤ 4. Therefore,
R(p) = 1− Pr[at least one Cj fails].
For 1 ≤ j ≤ 4, let Ej denote the event that Cj fails. We have
Pr[at least one Cj fails] = Pr[E1 or E2 or E3 or E4].
We note the following.
1. |Cj | = r1 − 1 for 1 ≤ j ≤ 4. Therefore,
Pr[Ei] = q
r1−1.
2. |Cj ∪ Cj′ | = 2(r1 − 1)− (r2 − 1) = 2r1 − r2 − 1, for all j, j
′, j 6= j′. Therefore,
Pr[Ej and Ej′ ] = q
2r1−r2−1.
3. |Cj∪Cj′∪Cj′′| = 3(r1−1)−3(r2−1) = 3r1−3r2, for all distinct j, j
′, j′′ such that 1 ≤ j, j′, j′′ ≤ 4.
Therefore,
Pr[Ej and Ej′ and Ej′′ ] = q
3r1−3r2 .
4. |C1 ∪ C2 ∪ C3 ∪ C4| = 4(r1 − 1)− 6(r2 − 1) = 4r1 − 6r2 + 2. Therefore,
Pr[E1 and E2 and E3 and E4] = q
4r1−6r2+2.
Applying the principle of inclusion-exclusion, we have
Pr[E1 or E2 or E3 or E4] =
(
4
1
)
qr1−1 −
(
4
2
)
q2r1−r2−1 +
(
4
3
)
q3r1−3r2 −
(
4
4
)
q4r1−6r2+2.
Therefore,
R(p) = 1− 4qr1−1 + 6q2r1−r2−1 − 4q3r1−3r2 + q4r1−6r2+2.
The following can be proven in a similar manner.
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Theorem 3.11. Suppose (X,B) is a t-(v, k, 1) design and let B ∈ B. Let q = 1− p, where p is the
probability that a block is available. Then
R(p) = 1−
(
k
1
)
qe1 +
(
k
2
)
qe2 −
(
k
3
)
qe3 + · · ·+ (−1)k+1
(
k
k
)
qek ,
where rj =
(v−jt−j)
(k−jt−j)
, for 1 ≤ j ≤ t, are the replication numbers of the design, and
ei =
min{i,t−1}∑
j=1
(−1)j+1
(
i
j
)
(rj − 1),
for 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
Proof. We use similar notation as in the proof of Theorem 3.10. We compute
Pr[at least one Cj fails] = Pr[E1 or E2 or E3 or E4 or · · · or Ek].
Let ei denote the cardinality of the union of i of the sets C1, . . . , Ck. We will apply the principle
of inclusion-exclusion to compute the values of the ei’s. Note that we make use of the fact that no
block intersects B in more than t− 1 points, so the intersection of t or more of the sets C1, . . . , Ck
is empty. Therefore,
e1 = r1 − 1
e2 = 2(r1 − 1)− (r2 − 1)
e3 = 3(r1 − 1)− 3(r2 − 1) + (r3 − 1),
etc., where no sum contains terms past rt−1. In general,
ei =
min{i,t−1}∑
j=1
(−1)j+1
(
i
j
)
(rj − 1),
for 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
Now that we have computed ei for each i, we can evaluate the probability that any number of
Ci’s fail. Recall that q = 1 − p, where p is the probability the player with that share is available.
A second application of the principle of inclusion-exclusion yields the desired result:
R(p) = 1−
(
k
1
)
qe1 +
(
k
2
)
qe2 −
(
k
3
)
qe3 + · · ·+ (−1)k+1
(
k
k
)
qek .
3.4 Expected Number of Minimal Repair Sets for SQS
In general, we can determine the expected number of repair sets for a given distribution design if
we know all the minimal repair sets. The following formula, which is proven in the same fashion
as Theorem 2.4, can be used.
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Theorem 3.12. Suppose (X,B) is a distribution design and let the minimal repair sets be enu-
merated as M1, . . . ,Ms. Then
E(p) =
s∑
j=1
p|Mi|.
Of course, for an arbitrary distribution design, there can be minimal repair sets of various sizes.
For example, in the case of Steiner quadruple systems, minimal repair sets can be of size two, three
or four.
We illustrate the computation of the expected number of available minimal repair sets on a
particular design, namely, the SQS(10).
Example 3.13. Here is the (unique) 3-(10, 4, 1)-design:
A0 = {1, 2, 4, 5} B0 = {1, 2, 3, 7} C0 = {1, 3, 5, 8}
A1 = {2, 3, 5, 6} B1 = {2, 3, 4, 8} C1 = {2, 4, 6, 9}
A2 = {3, 4, 6, 7} B2 = {3, 4, 5, 9} C2 = {3, 5, 7, 0}
A3 = {4, 5, 7, 8} B3 = {4, 5, 6, 0} C3 = {4, 6, 8, 1}
A4 = {5, 6, 8, 9} B4 = {5, 6, 7, 1} C4 = {5, 7, 9, 2}
A5 = {6, 7, 9, 0} B5 = {6, 7, 8, 2} C5 = {6, 8, 0, 3}
A6 = {7, 8, 0, 1} B6 = {7, 8, 9, 3} C6 = {7, 9, 1, 4}
A7 = {8, 9, 1, 2} B7 = {8, 9, 0, 4} C7 = {8, 0, 2, 5}
A8 = {9, 0, 2, 3} B8 = {9, 0, 1, 5} C8 = {9, 1, 3, 6}
A9 = {0, 1, 3, 4} B9 = {0, 1, 2, 6} C9 = {0, 2, 4, 7}
Suppose we want to repair the block A0 = {1, 2, 4, 5}. We consider minimal repair sets of sizes
2, 3 and 4 in turn. All the computations are applications of Theorem 3.12.
A repair set of size two consists of
• a block containing 1, 2 and a block containing 4, 5; or
• a block containing 1, 4 and a block containing 2, 5; or
• a block containing 1, 5 and a block containing 2, 4.
The total number of choices for these two blocks is 3 × 3 × 3 = 27 (there are three subcases, and
in each subcase there are three choices of each of the two blocks). Therefore, the expected number
of minimal repair sets of size two is 27p2.
A minimal repair set of size four consists of four blocks having the following form:
• a block containing 1, but none of 2, 4, 5
• a block containing 2, but none of 1, 4, 5
• a block containing 4, but none of 1, 2, 5
• a block containing 5, but none of 1, 2, 4.
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Table 1: Expected number of repair sets for SQS(v)
size type expected number
2 3(r2 − 1)
2p2
3 pair-pair-pair 4(r2 − 1)
3p3
3 pair-pair-point 12(r2 − 1)
2(r1 − 3r2 + 2)p
3
3 pair-point-point 6(r2 − 1)(r1 − 3r2 + 2)
2p3
4 (r1 − 3r2 + 2)
4p4
There are two choices for each of these four blocks, so the total number of choices is 24 = 16.
Therefore, the expected number of minimal repair sets of size four is 16p4.
A minimal repair set of size three can have three possible forms:
type pair-pair-pair: three pairs intersecting in a point, e.g., 12, 14, 15. There are four configura-
tions of this type.
type pair-pair-point: two pairs intersecting in a point, and a disjoint point e.g., 12, 14, 5. There
are twelve configurations of this type.
type pair-point-point: one pair, and two disjoint points, e.g., 12, 4, 5. There are six configura-
tions of this type.
After some counting, the expected number of minimal repair sets of size three is seen to be
(4× 33 + 12 × 32 × 2 + 6× 3× 22)p3 = 396p3.
Finally, we have
E(p) = 27p2 + 396p3 + 16p4.

The general case of an SQS(v) is similar. We tabulate the expected number of minimal repair
sets of the various types in the Table 1.
We can now combine the expected number of repair sets for each size and type to produce the
expected number of repair sets, which we record in the following theorem.
Theorem 3.14. Suppose (X,B) is an SQS(v) and let B ∈ B. Let q = 1 − p, where p is the
probability that a block is available. Then
E(p) = 3(r2 − 1)
2p2 + 2(r2 − 1)(3r1
2 − 12r1r2 + 6r1 + 11r2
2 − 10r2 + 2)p
3 + (r1 − 3r2 + 2)
4p4.
4 Discussion and Summary
We have introduced the problem of studying reliability of combinatorial RTS. We employed tech-
niques from network reliability theory to aid in the derivation of some of our formulas. Perhaps this
approach will prove useful in other combinatorial design problems that can be phrased in terms of
network reliability.
The material in this paper is from the Masters Thesis of the first author [4]. The thesis [4] also
studies efficient algorithms to actually find a repair set for various kinds of distribution designs.
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